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Abstract. Both the phenomenology and the theory of minority games (MG) with
more than two strategies per agent are different from those of the conventional and
extensively studied case S = 2. MGs with S > 2 exhibit nontrivial statistics of
the frequencies with which the agents select from their available decision making
strategies, with far-reaching implications. In the few theoretical MG studies with S > 2
published so far, these statistics could not be calculated analytically. This prevented
solution even in ergodic stationary states; equations for order parameters could only be
closed approximately, using simulation data. Here we carry out a generating functional
analysis of fake history batch MGs with arbitary values of S, and give an analytical
solution of the strategy frequency problem. This leads to closed equations for order
parameters in the ergodic regime, exact expressions for strategy selection statistics,
and phase diagrams. Our results find perfect confirmation in numerical simulations.
PACS numbers: 02.50.Le, 87.23.Ge, 05.70.Ln, 64.60.Ht
E-mail: nima@mth.kcl.ac.uk,ton.coolen@kcl.ac.uk
1. Introduction
Minority games [1, 2] were proposed as simple models with which to increase our
understanding of the origin of the observed nontrivial dynamics of markets; these
dynamics are believed to result from an interplay of cooperation, competition and
adaptation of interacting agents. Minority games were indeed found to show intriguing
nontrivial relations between observables such as the market volatility, overall bid
correlations and sensitivity to market perturbations, and the information available for
agents to act upon. Nevertheless, over the years we have found that they can to a
large extent be solved analytically using equilibrium and non-equilibrium statistical
mechanical techniques (see e.g. the recent textbooks [3, 4] and references therein). This
desirable combination of complexity and solvability is their beauty and appeal.
There have been many advances in the mathematical study of MGs, but nearly
all calculations have so far been carried out for S = 2, where S denotes the number
of trading strategies available to each agent. One typically finds phase transitions
separating an ergodic from a non-ergodic regime, which for S = 2 can be located exactly.
For S > 2, in contrast, no such exact results are available. Although mathematical
Batch minority games with arbitrary strategy numbers 2
theory has been developed along the lines of the S = 2 case [5, 6, 7, 8], the authors of
the latter studies ultimately ran into the nontrivial problem of calculating the statistics
of agents’ strategy selections, a problem which resisted analytical solution. In this paper
we generalize the theorists’ toolbox: we develop a generating functional analysis [9] for
MGs with arbitrary finite values of S, and show how to derive exact closed equations for
observables and predict phase transition lines. We will do so for the simplest so-called
batch version of the MG [10, 11], with fake (i.e. purely random) external information
[12].
Our paper is organized as follows. We start with model definitions and review the
phenomenology of MGs with S > 2 as observed in simulations, focusing on the crucial
differences with the more familiar S = 2 case and on the core problem of determining
the statistics of strategy selection frequencies. The next step is a formal generating
functional analysis (of which most details are relegated to an appendix), leading as
usual to an effective single agent process, here describing the evolution of S strategy
valuations. We then state the strategy selection frequency problem in the language of
the effective agent process, and solve it. The result is an exact (but nontrivial) set of
closed equations for the relevant observables in MGs with arbitrary S in the ergodic
phase, and predictions for the location of the phase transition (where ergodicity breaks
down). S = 3 is the simplest nontrivial situation to which our new theory applies, so
we present extensive applications to S = 3 and test each prediction against numerical
simulations. This is followed by some further (more limited) applications to S = 4 and
S = 5 MGs, again verified via simulation experiments, and predictions regarding market
volatility and predictability. Although the theory is initially set up for arbitrary types
and levels of decision noise, we will concentrate in this paper mostly on MGs with either
additive or absent decision noise. We end our paper with a discussion of our results and
their implications.
2. Definitions
The MG describes N agents in a market, labeled by i = 1 . . . N . Each agent i is
required to submit a bid bi(ℓ) ∈ {−1, 1} (e.g. ‘sell’ or ‘buy’) to this market, at each
round t ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . .} of the game, in response to public information which is distributed
to all agents. Those who subsequently find themselves in the minority group, i.e. those
i for which bi(t)[
∑
j bj(t)] < 0 (who sell when most wish to buy, or buy when most
wish to sell), make profit. In order to be successful in the game, agents must therefore
anticipate how their competitors are likely to respond to the public information.
The mathematical implementation of the game is as follows. The public information
at time t (e.g. the state of the market) is represented by an integer number µ(t) ∈
{1, . . . , p}. Each agent i has S private strategies Ria ∈ {−1, 1}p at his disposal, labeled
by a = 1 . . . S, with which to convert the observed information into a binary bid. A
strategy is a look-up table giving prescribed bids for each of the p possible states of
the market: upon observing µ(t) = µ at time t, strategy a of agent i would prescribe
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submitting the bid bi(t) = R
ia
µ . All pNS entries R
ia
µ ∈ {−1, 1} are drawn randomly and
independently at the start of the game, with equal probabilities. The strategy used by
agent i at time t is called his ‘active strategy’, and denoted by ai(t) ∈ {1, . . . , S}. Given
the active strategies of all agents, their collective responses are fully deterministic; the
dynamics of the MG evolves around the evolution of the N active strategies ai(t).
Agents in the MG select their active strategies on the basis of strategy valuations
via(t), which indicate how often each strategy would have been profitable if it had been
played from the start of the game. In the so-called batch version of the MG these
valuations are continually updated following
via(t+ 1) = via(t) + θia(t)− η˜√
N
p∑
µ=1
Aµ(t)R
ia
µ (1)
Here Aµ(t) = N
−1/2∑
j R
jaj(t)
µ is the re-scaled overall market bid at time t that would
be observed upon presentation of external information µ, η˜ (the ‘learning rate’) is a
parameter that controls the characteristics time scales of the process, and θia(t) denotes
a (small) perturbation that enables us to define response functions later. We abbreviate
vi(t) = (vi1(t), . . . , viS(t)) ∈ IRS. The active strategies are now determined at each time
t and for each agent i by a function m : IRS → {1, . . . , S} that promotes strategies with
large valuations, but may allow for a degree of randomness. Typical choices are
deterministic : m(v) = argmaxa[va] (2)
additive noise : m(v) = argmaxa[va + Tza(ℓ)] (3)
multiplicative noise : m(v) = r(ℓ) argmaxa[va] + [1− r(ℓ)]a(ℓ) (4)
Here za(t) is a zero-average and unit-variance random variable, drawn independently for
each (a, t), T ≥ 0 is a parameter to control the randomness in (3), r(t) ∈ {0, 1} is drawn
randomly and independently for each ℓ from some distribution P (r), and a(t) is drawn
randomly and independently for each t from {1, . . . , S} (with equal probabilities). We
recover the deterministic case (2) by taking the limit T → 0 in (3), or P (r)→ δ(r − 1)
in (4). In order to compactify subsequent equations we will write all random variables
at time t in (3,4), which will be drawn separately and independently for each of the N
agents, as z(t). This allows us to write generally ai(t) = m(v
i(t), zi(t)). The (stochastic)
equations describing the MG with arbitrary S can therefore be written as
via(t+ 1) = via(t) + θia(t)− η˜
N
p∑
µ=1
N∑
j=1
Riaµ R
jm(vj(t),zj (t))
µ (5)
Alternatively we can write the process (5) in probabilistic form, i.e. as an evolution
equation for the probability density P (v1, . . . ,vN) of the N strategy valuation vectors.
Upon abbreviating {z} = (z1, . . . , zN) and {v} = (v1, . . . ,vN) this can be written as
Pt+1({v}) =
∫
d{v′} Wt({v}; {v′})Pt({v′}) (6)
Wt({v}; {v′}) =
〈∏
ia
δ
[
via − v′ia − θia(t) +
η˜
N
∑
µj
Riaµ R
jm(vj′,zj)
µ
]〉
{z}
(7)
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Averages over the process (6,7) are written as 〈. . .〉. The market fluctuations in the MG
are characterized by the average 〈A(t)〉 = p−1∑µ〈Aµ(t)〉, which one expects to be zero,
and the covariance kernel Ξtt′ = p
−1∑
µ〈[Aµ(t)−〈A(t)〉][Aµ(t′)−〈A(t′)〉]〉. In particular,
the volatility σ is defined by σ2 = limτ→∞ τ−1
∑τ
t=1 Ξtt, and the direct predictability is
measured by H = p−1
∑
µ[limτ→∞ τ
−1∑τ
t=1(Aµ(t) − 〈A(t)〉)]2 = limτ→∞ τ−2
∑τ
tt′=1 Ξtt′ .
For detailed discussions of the relations between the above and various alternative MG
versions we refer to [3, 4].
3. Phenomenology of MGs with arbitrary values of S
Before diving into theory it is perhaps helpful to describe first the phenomenology
of MGs with S > 2, as observed in numerical simulations, with emphasis on those
aspects in which they are distinct from S = 2 MGs. All simulations of which results
are shown in the remainder of this paper involved MGs with N = 4097 agents and
no decision noise, and stationary state measurements were taken either over the time
interval 500 ≤ t ≤ 3000 (for α < 32) or over 100 ≤ t ≤ 1100 (for α ≥ 32).
In early (numerical and theoretical) studies on MGs with S > 2 the emphasis was
often on the behaviour of the volatility. Its dependence on α was found to be very similar
for different values of S, but with the phase transition point αc(S) (that separates a
nonergodic regime at small values of α from an ergodic regime for large α) increasing
with increasing values of S. This latter dependence was conjectured in [6] to be roughly
α(S) ≈ αc(2) + 12(S − 2). The fundamental differences between S = 2 MGs and S > 2
MGs become clear as soon as one tries to go beyond measuring observables derived from
the overall market bid (like the volatility), but turns to quantities such as the fraction
of ‘frozen’ agents or the long-time correlations. For S > 2 it is no longer obvious how
such objects must be defined. Some agents are found to play just one strategy, some
play two, some play three, etc.; for S > 2 agents can apparently be ‘frozen’ to various
extents, which cannot be captured by a single number φ (the fraction of frozen agents
for S = 2, see e.g. [3, 4]). Similarly, it is not a priori clear which variables should be
measured to define correlation functions.
The dynamics of MGs is about the selection of active strategies ai(t) ∈ {1, . . . , S}
by the agents, so let us observe in simulations how agents select strategies for S > 2
in the stationary state. We define the frequencies f ia = limτ→∞ τ
−1∑
t≤τ δa,ai(t), where
f ia measures the fraction of time during which agent i played strategy a. Each vector
fi = (f
i
1, . . . , f
i
S) is a point in the (S − 1)-dimensional plane
∑S
a=1 f
i
a = 1 in [0, 1]
S. The
collection of these N points gives a view on the collective stationary state of the system.
For S = 3 the vectors fi can be plotted directly as points in [0, 1]
3, giving rise to figures
such as fig. 1. We can extract relevant information from these graphs. For large α the
agents tend to involve all three strategies, but not with identical frequencies (otherwise
one would have seen fi = (
1
3
, 1
3
, 1
3
) for all i). As α is reduced, the vectors fi tend to
concentrate on the borders of the plane
∑S
a=1 f
i
a = 1 in [0, 1]
S, which is where one of
the f ia equals zero, implying agents who play only two of their strategies, but again not
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α = 1/64
α = 1
α = 64
Figure 1. Each plot shows the frequency vectors fi = (f
i
1
, f i
2
, f i
3
) with which the agents
use their three strategies, drawn for each agent i as a point in [0, 1]3 (giving N points
per plot), as obtained from numerical simulations of an MG without decision noise with
N = 4097 and S = 3. The constraint
∑
a f
i
a = 1 for all i implies that all points are in
the plane that goes through the three corners {(1, 0, 0), (0, 1, 0), (0, 0, 1)} (each corner
represents agents ‘frozen’ into using a single strategy). Left plots: unbiased initial
conditions (random initial strategy valuations drawn from [−10−4, 10−4]). Right plots:
biased initial conditions (random initial strategy valuations drawn from [−10, 10]).
with identical frequencies. Upon reducing α further we enter the nonergodic regime
(which explains the difference between the two graphs for α = 1/64), with points either
concentrating in the corners {(1, 0, 0), (0, 1, 0), (0, 0, 1)} (for biased initialization) or on
more constrained subsets where two strategies are played in very specific combinations
(for unbiased initialization). If we measure the distribution ̺(fa) = N
−1∑
i δ(fa−f ia) we
also obtain quantitative information on the density of points in various regions of [0, 1]3,
complementing the information in figure 1. Typical examples are shown in figure 2, for
different values of α; note that the symmetry of the problem guarantees that for N →∞
all S distributions ̺(fa) must be identical (this is confirmed in simulations). Temporal
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f1α
̺(f1)
f1α
̺(f1)
Figure 2. Histograms of the fraction ̺(f1) of agents that play strategy 1 with
frequency f1 in the stationary state (observed in simulations with N = 4097 and
S = 3), for α ∈ {1/128, 1/64, . . . , 32, 64} (increasing by a factor 2 at each step).
Left: unbiased initial conditions (random initial strategy valuations drawn from
[−10−4, 10−4]). Right: biased initial conditions (random initial strategy valuations
drawn from [−10, 10]).
t
i
t
Figure 3. Evolution in time of active strategy selections for the first 41 out of the
total number N = 4097 of agents in an MG with S = 3, following unbiased initial
conditions. The chosen strategies are indicated by grey levels: white means ai(t) = 1,
grey means ai(t) = 2, and black means ai(t) = 3. Left graph: α = 1/128 (in the
nonergodic regime). Right graph: α = 8 (in the ergodic regime).
information on how such macroscopic states are realized can be obtained by showing the
variables ai(t) as functions of time. For S = 3 and unbiased initial conditions this has
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α = 1/64
α = 1
α = 64
Figure 4. Each plot shows the N valuation velocity vectors (vi
1
, vi
2
, vi
3
) as points
in IR3, obtained from numerical simulations of an MG without decision noise, with
N = 4097 and S = 3. Left plots: unbiased initial conditions (random initial strategy
valuations drawn from [−10−4, 10−4]). Right plots: biased initial conditions (random
initial strategy valuations drawn from [−10, 10]). Note the vastly different scales in
the three graphs (increasing from top to bottom).
been done using grey-scale coding in figure 3, showing the difference between the small
α regime (left), where agents tend to alternate two of their strategies equally, and the
large α regime, where agents tend to involve all three strategies, at non-uniform rates.
Strategy selections are made on the basis of strategy valuations, which in MGs are
known to grow potentially linearly with time. Only those strategies with the largest
growth rates will be played. If one measures the growth rates (or ‘strategy velocities’)
of the valuations, via = τ
−1(via(t + τ) − via(t)), in the stationary state (i.e. for large τ
and t) for S = 3, and subsequently plots the N velocity vectors (vi1, v
i
2, v
i
3) as points
in IR3, one obtains graphs as in figure 4. For small α all velocities are concentrated
very close to the origin; as α is increased they become consistently more negative, with
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α = 1/64
α = 1
α = 64
Figure 5. The plots show the first three components of the frequency vectors
fi = (f
i
1
, f i
2
, f i
3
, f i
4
) with which the agents use their three strategies, drawn for each agent
i as a point in [0, 1]3 (giving N points per plot), obtained from numerical simulations
of an MG without decision noise, with N = 4097 and S = 4. The constraint
∑
a f
i
a = 1
for all i now implies that all points are in a the hyper-plane of which in the present
graph one sees a 3-dimensional projection. Left plots: unbiased initial conditions
(random initial strategy valuations drawn from [−10−4, 10−4]). Right plots: biased
initial conditions (random initial strategy valuations drawn from [−10, 10]).
concentration of points with two identical components at intermediate α (consistent
with agents playing two strategies only) and concentration of points along the diagonal
where all three components are identical for large α (consistent with agents playing all
three strategies).
For S = 4 one can obviously no longer plot the frequency vectors fi = (f
i
1, f
i
2, f
i
3, f
i
4)
as points in [0, 1]3, but one has to resort to projection from 4D to 3D: we plot in figure
5 only the first three components (f i1, f
i
2, f
i
3). The corresponding strategy frequency
distributions are shown in figure 6. Once more we observe the ergodicity/nonergodicity
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f1α
̺(f1)
f1α
̺(f1)
Figure 6. Histograms of the fraction ̺(f1) of agents that play strategy 1 with
frequency f in the stationary state (observed in simulations with N = 4097 and
S = 4), for α ∈ {1/128, 1/64, . . . , 32, 64} (increasing by a factor 2 at each step).
Left: unbiased initial conditions (random initial strategy valuations drawn from
[−10−4, 10−4]). Right: biased initial conditions (random initial strategy valuations
drawn from [−10, 10]).
phase transition (here occurring for a larger value of α than was the case at S = 3), and
the tendency at small α for agents to play only a specific subset of their four strategies.
For unbiased initial conditions the agents are seen to play in the nonergodic regime
always either one or two of their strategies; this curious tendency, for which there is no
immediate obvious explanation, is found also for larger values of S (we have confirmed
this for values up to S = 6). Plotting the first three components of the N valuation
velocity vectors (vi1, v
i
2, v
i
3, v
i
4) leads to the graphs shown in figure 7. As with S = 3
we see the agents playing all S strategies for large α, but selecting specific subsets for
smaller α, generally with nontrivial frequencies. Here there are more options than at
S = 3 for doing so: agents can and will go for either one, two, three or four strategies.
If we finally measure and plot the distribution ̺(va) = N
−1∑
i δ(va − via) of the N
strategy velocities for strategy a, we see clearly a consistent tendency of the strategy
velocities to shift towards negative values as α increases (which indicates an increasing
inability of the agents to be successful in the game). Examples are shown in figure 8 at
different values of α, for S = 3 and S = 4, both following unbiased initial conditions.
The symmetry of the problem guarantees that for N → ∞ the distribution ̺(va) will
be the same for all a (although it will obviously depend on S).
It is clear from these figures that the complexities of MGs with S > 2 are in the
nontrivial dependence on control parameters and initial conditions of the frequencies
with which the agents use their available strategies. Mathematically one finds this
reflected in a nontrivial closure problem, as we will see below.
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α = 1/64
α = 1
α = 64
Figure 7. Each plot shows the first three components (vi
1
, vi
2
, vi
3
) of the N valuation
velocity vectors as points in IR3, obtained from numerical simulations of an MG without
decision noise, with N = 4097 and S = 4. Left plots: unbiased initial conditions
(random initial strategy valuations drawn from [−10−4, 10−4]). Right plots: biased
initial conditions (random initial strategy valuations drawn from [−10, 10]). Note the
different scales in the three graphs (increasing from top to bottom).
4. Generating functional analysis for general S
In solving the dynamics of the process (6,7) for general S we can follow the strategy of
the S = 2 case (see e.g. [10, 11] or [4]), although we no longer benefit from simplifications
such as a reduction to equations and observables with valuation differences only. We will
therefore suppress details and give only relevant intermediate stages of the calculation.
For general S the canonical disorder-averaged‡ moment generating functional will be
Z[ψ] =
〈
ei
∑
iat
ψia(t)δa,ai(t)
〉
(8)
‡ As always, the pNS strategy entries Riaµ are regarded as frozen disorder, and disorder averages are
written as (. . .).
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v1α
̺(v1)
v1α
̺(v1)
Figure 8. Histograms of the fraction ̺(v1) of agents that have strategy velocity v1
for strategy 1 in the stationary state (observed in simulations with N = 4097), for
α ∈ {1/128, 1/64, . . . , 32, 64} (increasing by a factor 2 at each step). Left: S = 3.
Right: S = 4. All measurements were taken following unbiased initial conditions
(random initial strategy valuations drawn from [−10−4, 10−4]).
where ai(t) = m(v
i(t), zi(t)) is the active strategy of agent i at time t. It generates
dynamical observables such as the correlation- and response functions
Ctt′ =
1
N
∑
ia
〈δa,ai(t)δa,ai(t′)〉 = − lim
ψ→0
1
N
∑
ia
∂2Z[ψ]
∂ψia(t)∂ψia(t′)
(9)
Gtt′ =
1
N
∑
ia
∂〈δa,ai(t)〉
∂θia(t′)
= −i lim
ψ→0
1
N
∑
ia
∂2Z[ψ]
∂ψia(t)∂θia(t′)
(10)
Ctt′ gives the likelihood that the active strategies at times t and t
′ are identical; Gtt′
measures the increase in probability of a strategy being active at time t following a
perturbation of its valuation at time t′ (both averaged over all agents and over the
disorder). Causality guarantees that Gtt′ = 0 for t ≤ t′. We note that random strategy
selection by the agents would give Ctt′ = S
−1+ δtt′(1−S−1) and Gtt′ = 0. A fully frozen
state would be characterized by Ctt′ = 1 and Gtt′ = 0.
The functional (8) is an average over all possible paths of the combined N -agent
state vector {v} in time. The probability density for each path is a product of the
kernels Wt(. . .) in (7), so upon writing the δ-functions in (7) in integral form one finds
Z[ψ] =
∫ [∏
it
dvi(t)dvˆi(t)
(2π)S
]
P0(v
1, . . . ,vN) ei
∑
iat
vˆia(t)[v
i
a(t+1)−via(t)−θia(t)]
×
〈
ei
∑
iat
ψia(t)δa,m(vi(t),zi(t))
[
e
i(η˜/N)
∑
ijaa′tµ
Riaµ R
ja′
µ vˆia(t)δa′ ,m(vj (t),zj(t))
]〉
{z}
(11)
The dependence on strategy entries in the exponent is linearized by introducing auxiliary
variables xµt = η˜N
−1/2∑
ia vˆ
i
a(t)R
ia
µ (via suitable δ-functions), after which the disorder
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average is carried out. In leading order in N , the result depends on the {v} only via
Ctt′({v, z}) = 1
N
∑
ia
δa,m(vi(t),zi(t))δa,m(vi(t′),zi(t′)) (12)
Ktt′({v, z}) = 1
N
∑
ia
δa,m(vi(t),zi(t))vˆ
i
a(t
′) (13)
Ltt′({v, z}) = 1
N
∑
ia
vˆia(t)vˆ
i
a(t
′) (14)
Upon isolating (12,13,14) via integrals over suitable δ-functions we can factorize and
integrate out the site-dependent variables, given site-factorized initial conditions. We
then find an expression for Z[ψ] which can for N →∞ be evaluated by steepest descent:
Z[ψ] =
∫ [∏
tt′
dCtt′dCˆtt′dKtt′dKˆtt′dLtt′dLˆtt′
]
eN(Ψ+Φ+Ω)+O(logN) (15)
Ψ = i
∑
tt′
[
Ctt′Cˆtt′ +Ktt′Kˆtt′ + Ltt′Lˆtt′
]
(16)
Φ = α log
∫ [∏
t
dxtdxˆt
2π
eixˆtxt
]
e−
1
2
∑
tt′[xtCtt′xt′+η˜
2xˆtLtt′ xˆt′−2ηˆxtKtt′ xˆt′] (17)
Ω =
1
N
∑
i
log
〈[∏
at
dva(t)dvˆa(t)
2π
]
P0(v(0))
× e−i
∑
att′[Cˆtt′δa,m(v(t),z(t))δa,m(v(t′),z(t′))+Lˆtt′ vˆa(t)vˆa(t
′)+Kˆtt′δa,m(v(t),z(t))vˆa(t
′)]
× ei
∑
at
vˆa(t)[va(t+1)−va(t)−θia(t)]+i
∑
at
ψia(t)δa,m(v(t),z(t))
〉
(18)
For N →∞ the order parameters {C, Cˆ,K, Kˆ, L, Lˆ} are determined by the saddle-point
equations of the exponent Ψ + Φ + Ω. Working out these equations is straightforward
but lengthy, see Appendix A. The resulting theory can be written solely in terms of the
kernels (9,10), and, upon choosing θia(t) = θa(t), formulated in terms of the following
stochastic process for the strategy valuations v = (v1, . . . , vS) of a single ‘effective agent’,
with zero-average coloured Gaussian noise forces {ηa} and a retarded self-interaction:
va(t+ 1) = va(t) + θa(t)− α
∑
t′≤t
Rtt′δa,m(v(t′),z(t′)) +
√
α ηa(t) (19)
Rtt′ = η˜(1I + η˜G)
−1
tt′ 〈ηa(t)ηb(t′)〉 = δab(RCR†)tt′ (20)
In terms of averages over the process (19,20), the kernels C and G must be solved from
Ctt′ =
∑
a
〈δa,m(v(t),z(t))δa,m(v(t′),z(t′))〉 Gtt′ =
∑
a
∂〈δa,m(v(t),z(t))〉
∂θa(t′)
(21)
Finally, in a similar manner one derives exact expressions, in the limit N → ∞,
for the disorder-averaged bid covariance matrix Ξtt′ and also for the volatility and
predictability σ and H (which both should be self-averaging for N → ∞). Here the
appropriate generating functional is
Z[φ] =
〈
ei
∑
iµt
φiµ(t)Aµ(t)
〉
(22)
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From (22), which is calculated from the result of evaluating the previous functional Z[ψ]
upon making simple substitutions (see Appendix B for details), one obtains
lim
N→∞
〈Aµ(t)〉 = − i lim
N→∞
lim
φ→0
∂Z[φ]
∂φµ(t)
= 0 (23)
lim
N→∞
1
p
∑
µ
〈Aµ(t)Aµ(t′)〉 = − lim
N→∞
1
p
∑
µ
lim
φ→0
∂2Z[φ]
∂φµ(t)∂φµ(t′)
= η˜−2(RCR†)tt′ (24)
It follows that in the limit N →∞ we must have Ξtt′ = 1η˜2 (RCR†)tt′ , and hence
σ2 = η˜−2 lim
τ→∞
1
τ
τ∑
t=1
(RCR†)tt H = η˜
−2 lim
τ→∞
1
τ 2
τ∑
tt′=1
(RCR†)tt′ (25)
5. Stationary states: the strategy frequency problem
To find time-translation invariant stationary solutions of our MG without anomalous
response and with weak long-term memory memory we put Ctt′ = C(t − t′) and
Gtt′ = G(t − t′), and we define the usual static order parameters, viz. the persistent
correlations c = limt→∞C(t) and the static susceptibility χ =
∑
t>0G(t). Consequently
also Rtt′ = R(t− t′) and
χ
R
=
∑
t≥0
R(t) =
η˜
1 + η˜χ
(26)
We extract from (19,20) an equation for the valuation growth rates va = limt→∞ va(t)/t.
This involves the ‘frozen’ Gaussian fields ηa = limt→∞ t
−1∑
t′≤t ηa(t′), the persistent
perturbations θa = limt→∞ t−1
∑
t′≤t θa(t
′) and the strategy selection frequencies fa:
va = θa +
√
α ηa − αχRfa fa = limt→∞
1
t
∑
s≤t
〈δa,m(v(s),z)〉z (27)
Since 〈ηa〉 = 0 and 〈ηaηb〉 = δabcχ2R , we write ηa = χR
√
cxa, where x = (x1, . . . , xS)
is a vector of S uncorrelated zero-average and unit-variance frozen Gaussian variables.
So (27) are 2S relations for the 2S unknown variables (v1, . . . , vS) and (f1, . . . , fS),
parametrized by x. Elimination of the valuation growth rates would give a formula for
fa(x), with a = 1 . . . S. To emphasize this structure of our problem we write (27) as
fa(x) = xa
√
c
α
+
θa− va(x)
αχ
R
fa(x) = lim
t→∞
1
t
∑
s≤t
〈δa,m(v(s,x),z)〉z (28)
One easily derives from (21) closed equations for the static order parameters, via
c = limt→∞ t−2
∑
ss′≤tC(s − s′) and χ = limt→∞ t−1
∑
s≤t ∂〈δa,m(v(s),z(s))〉/∂θa, in terms
of the solution {fa(x)} of (28). The equation for χ can be simplified further upon noting
that ∂/∂θa = α
−1/2∂/∂ηa = (χR
√
αc)−1∂/∂xa. The result is
c =
∫
Dx
∑
a
f 2a (x) χ =
1
χ
R
√
αc
∫
Dx
∑
a
xafa(x) (29)
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(with the usual short-hand Dx = (2π)−
1
2 e−
1
2
x2dx). The perturbation fields θa are now
no longer needed and can be set to zero, which simplifies (28) to
fa(x) = xa
√
c
α
− va(x)
αχ
R
fa(x) = lim
t→∞
1
t
∑
s≤t
〈δa,m(v(s,x),z)〉z (30)
Solving the stationary state of the MG, including finding the phase transition line
marked by a divergence of χ, thus boils down to solving {fa(x)} from (30). This is
the strategy frequency problem. The difficulty is in the second part of (30): even if
two strategies (a, b) have va(x) = vb(x) it does not follow that fa(x) = fb(x) (this
is also clear in simulations). All valuation growth rates vc(x), including those with
c /∈ {a, b}, will influence fa(x) and fb(x). The frequencies depend in a highly nontrivial
way on both the realization of the Gaussian vector x (which represents the diversity
in the original N -agent population) and the control parameter α. Even the transients
of the valuations, i.e. the full va(s,x) rather than just their growth rates va(x), could
in principle impact on the long-term frequencies {fa(x)}. All this appears to make the
problem practically insoluble. For S = 2 the situation could be saved upon translation
of our equations into the language of valuation differences; there was only one relevant
quantity, q˜ = v1 − v2, and what mattered was only whether or not q˜ = 0. For S > 2
this is no longer true.
6. Solution of the strategy frequency problem
We turn to the general solution of the strategy frequency problem, for arbitrary S and
additive§ decision noise: m(v, z) = argmaxa[va + Tza]. This includes the deterministic
case for T = 0. We define v⋆(x) = maxb vb(x), and the set Λ(x) of all strategy indices
for which va(x) = v
⋆(x):
Λ(x) =
{
a| va(x) = max
b
vb(x)
}
⊆ {1, . . . , S} |Λ(x)| > 0 (31)
The solution now proceeds in three stages:
• Since va(s,x) = s[va(x) + εa(s,x)] with lims→∞ εa(s,x) = 0 we may write for the
second equation in (28)
fa(x) = lim
s→∞
〈 ∏
b6=a
〈
θ
[
va(x)− vb(x) + εa(s,x)− εb(s,x) + T (z−z
′)
s
]〉
z′
〉
z
This quantity can be nonzero only for a ∈ Λ(x). Hence, once we know Λ(x) and
v⋆(x) the problem is solved, since in combination with (28) we may write
a /∈ Λ(x) : fa(x) = 0, va(x) = xaχR
√
αc (32)
a ∈ Λ(x) : fa(x) = xa
√
c
α
− v
⋆(x)
αχ
R
, va(x) = v
⋆(x) (33)
§ The solution in the case of multiplicative decision noise is not identical but very similar to the one
discussed here; see Appendix D for details.
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• Next we calculate v⋆(x). Probability normalization guarantees that ∑a fa(x) = 1
for any x, but since fa(x) 6= 0 only for a ∈ Λ(x) we have in fact ∑a∈Λ(x) fa(x) = 1.
Summing over the indices in (33) therefore leads to
v⋆(x) =
χ
R
√
αc
|Λ(x)|
∑
a∈Λ(x)
xa − αχR|Λ(x)| (34)
Upon abbreviating |Λ(x)|−1∑b∈Λ(x) Ub = 〈U〉Λ(x) our equations (32,33) then become
a /∈Λ(x) : fa(x) = 0, va(x) = xaχR
√
αc (35)
a∈Λ(x) : fa(x) = 1|Λ(x)| +
√
c
α
(
xa− 〈x〉Λ(x)
)
, va(x) = v
⋆(x) (36)
• What remains is to determine the set Λ(x). The definition (31) of Λ(x) demands
that va(x) < v
⋆(x) for all a 6∈ Λ(x), i.e.
a 6∈ Λ(x) : xa < 〈x〉Λ(x) −
√
α
c
1
|Λ(x)| (37)
However, we have similar inequalities for a ∈ Λ(x), as (36) must obey fa(x) ∈ [0, 1]:
a ∈ Λ(x) : xa ≥ 〈x〉Λ(x) −
√
α
c
1
|Λ(x)| (38)
xa ≤ 〈x〉Λ(x) −
√
α
c
1
|Λ(x)| +
√
α
c
(39)
These last three groups of inequalities turn out to determine the set Λ(x) uniquely.
Firstly, they tell us that Λ(x) must contain the indices of the ℓ largest components
of the vector x, where ℓ = |Λ(x)|. With probability one we may assume all
components of x to be different, so for each x there is a unique permutation
π
x
: {1, . . . , S} → {1, . . . , S} for which these components will be ordered according
to xπ(1) > xπ(2) > . . . > xπ(S). We may now translate our key inequalities into the
following three conditions, where ℓ = |Λ(x)| ∈ {1, . . . , S} is the only quantity left
to be solved, and with the ordering permutation π = π
x
:
xπ(ℓ) ≥ 1
ℓ−1
ℓ−1∑
m=1
xπ(m) − 1
ℓ−1
√
α
c
if ℓ > 1 (40)
xπ(ℓ+1) <
1
ℓ
ℓ∑
m=1
xπ(m) − 1
ℓ
√
α
c
if ℓ < S (41)
xπ(1) ≤ 1
ℓ
ℓ∑
m=1
xπ(m) − 1
ℓ
√
α
c
+
√
α
c
(42)
The solution is the following: ℓ is the smallest number in {1, . . . , S} for which (41)
holds (if any), whereas if (41) never holds then ℓ = S. By construction we thereby
satisfy both (40) and (41). What remains is to show that also (42) will be satisfied,
and that the solution is unique. Clearly (42) holds when ℓ = 1. To prove (42) for
ℓ > 1 we first define Xk = k
−1∑
m≤k xπ(m) for k ≤ ℓ. We know from (40) that
Xk =
1
k
k−1∑
m=1
xπ(m) +
1
k
xπ(k)
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≥ 1
k
k−1∑
m=1
xπ(m) +
1
k(k−1)
k−1∑
m=1
xπ(m) − 1
k(k−1)
√
α
c
= Xk−1 − 1
k(k−1)
√
α
c
Hence Xℓ ≥ X1 −
√
α
c
∑ℓ
m=2
1
m(m−1) = xπ(1) −
√
α
c
∑ℓ
m=2
1
m(m−1) , so that
xπ(1) ≤ 1
ℓ
ℓ∑
m=1
xπ(m) +
√
α
c
ℓ−1∑
m=1
1
m(m+ 1)
=
1
ℓ
ℓ∑
m=1
xπ(m) +
√
α
c
ℓ− 1
ℓ
This is the inequality (42) that we set out to prove. The corollary is that we have
indeed defined a self-consistent solution of our equations. The above solution must
be unique: any alternative choice of ℓ (rather than the smallest) that satisfies (41)
would always make the previous (smallest) choice induce a violation of (40).
We may now summarize the solution of the strategy frequency problem for additive
decision noise as follows:
a /∈ Λ(x) : fa(x) = 0 (43)
a ∈ Λ(x) : fa(x) = 1
ℓ(x)
+
√
c
α
(
xa− 〈x〉Λ(x)
)
(44)
Λ(x) = {π
x
(1), . . . , π
x
(ℓ(x))} (45)
π
x
: permutation such that xπ(1) > xπ(2) > . . . > xπ(S) (46)
ℓ(x) : defined by the conditions (47)
xπ(ℓ+1) <
1
ℓ
ℓ∑
m=1
xπ(m) − 1
ℓ
√
α
c
if ℓ < S (48)
xπ(k+1) >
1
k
k∑
m=1
xπ(m) − 1
k
√
α
c
for all k < ℓ (49)
The meaning of this stationary state solution is as follows. The randomness induced by
the Gaussian variables x represents the variability in the original N -agent population.
The set Λ(x) contains the strategies that will be played by the effective agent, albeit
with different frequencies. Strategies a /∈ Λ(x) are never played. Apparently, for a
strategy a to be in the ‘active’ set Λ(x), it must have an xa that is sufficiently large,
and sufficiently close to the components of the other strategies in the active set.
Since expressions (43,44) depend only on Λ(x), i.e. on π
x
and ℓ (see above), we
may abbreviate these formulae as fa(x|πx, ℓ). Averages of the form
∫
Dx Φ({xa, fa(x))
can now be written as a sum over all permutations π of {1, . . . , S}, with a function
C(π|x) = δπ,πx that selects the right component ordering permutation for each x:∫
Dx Φ({xa, fa(x)}) =
∑
π
S∑
ℓ=1
∫
Dx C(π|x) Φ({xa, fa(x|π, ℓ)})
×∏
a<ℓ
θ
[
xπ(a+1) − 1
a
a∑
m=1
xπ(m) +
1
a
√
α
c
]
(50)
×
{
δℓS + (1− δℓS) θ
[1
ℓ
ℓ∑
m=1
xπ(m) − 1
ℓ
√
α
c
− xπ(ℓ+1)
]}
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where
C(π|x) =
S−1∏
a=1
θ[xπ(a) − xπ(a+1)] (51)
7. The static theory for arbitrary S
In those cases where one seeks to calculate the average of a function Φ that is invariant
under all permutations of the index set {1, . . . , S}, as in (29), one may use this invariance
to simplify the calculation. Here the average will equal the contribution from one
particular ordering of the components of x (and its associated permutation π
x
, for
which we may take the identity permutation) times the number S! of permutations:∫
Dx Φ({xa, fa(x)}) = S!
S∑
ℓ=1
∫
Dx
S−1∏
a=1
θ[xa − xa+1]Φ({xa, fa(x|ℓ)})
×∏
a<ℓ
θ
[
xa+1 − 1
a
a∑
m=1
xm +
1
a
√
α
c
]
×
{
δℓS + (1− δℓS) θ
[1
ℓ
ℓ∑
m=1
xm− 1
ℓ
√
α
c
− xℓ+1
]}
(52)
In particular, upon application to (29) and using (43,44) we have now arrived at fully
explicit and closed equations for our static order parameters:
c = S!
S∑
ℓ=1
ℓ∑
a=1
∫
Dx
S−1∏
a=1
θ[xa−xa+1]
∏
a<ℓ
θ
[
xa+1− 1
a
a∑
m=1
xm+
1
a
√
α
c
]
×
{
δℓS + (1− δℓS) θ
[1
ℓ
ℓ∑
m=1
xm− 1
ℓ
√
α
c
− xℓ+1
]}
×
[1
ℓ
+
√
c
α
(
xa− 1
ℓ
ℓ∑
m=1
xm
)]2
(53)
η˜χ
1+η˜χ
=
S!√
αc
S∑
ℓ=1
ℓ∑
a=1
∫
Dx
S−1∏
a=1
θ[xa − xa+1]
∏
a<ℓ
θ
[
xa+1 − 1
a
a∑
m=1
xm +
1
a
√
α
c
]
×
{
δℓS + (1− δℓS) θ
[1
ℓ
ℓ∑
m=1
xm− 1
ℓ
√
α
c
− xℓ+1
]}
× xa
[1
ℓ
+
√
c
α
(
xa− 1
ℓ
ℓ∑
m=1
xm
)]
(54)
For any given value of α one first solves (53) for c, after which χ is calculated via (54).
The χ = ∞ phase transition occurs when the right-hand side of (54) equals one, and
defines the critical point αc(S). Numerical solution of (53,54) for S ∈ {2, 3, 4, 5} gives
the following values (accurate up to the last digit given):
S 2 3 4 5
αc(S) 0.337 0.824 1.324 1.822
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These values are remarkably close to those one would predict on the basis of the heuristic
relation α(S) ≈ αc(2) + 12(S − 2), as proposed in [6], but not identical.
Below the critical point, in the nonergodic regime α < αc(S) the above theory
no longer applies, as its assumption of finite integrated response χ is violated. For
S = 2 it was shown [10, 11] that upon replacing (53) by the equation χ−1 = 0, where
χ is calculated from (54), the agreement between ergodic theory and simulations with
biased initializations in the nonergodic regime could be improved. For S > 2 such
heuristic improvements are again possible but more awkward. Furthermore, they are
entirely ad hoc and artificial, and therefore mostly of cosmetic merit, so we have decided
to restrict ourselves here to the theory (53,54).
For arbitrary S we must also generalize the concept of ‘frozen agents’ and the
associated order parameter φ: we define φk as the fraction of agents that in the
stationary state play k of their S strategies. Since k is simply the size of the active
set Λ(x) in the language of (52) the order parameter φk is the average of the function
Φ({xa, fa(x|ℓ)}) = δkℓ, so our solution immediately tells us that
φℓ<S = S!
∫
Dx
S−1∏
a=1
θ[xa − xa+1]
ℓ∏
a=1
θ
[
xa − 1
a
a∑
m=1
xm +
1
a
√
α
c
]
× θ
[1
ℓ
ℓ∑
m=1
xm− 1
ℓ
√
α
c
− xℓ+1
]
(55)
φS = S!
∫
Dx
S−1∏
a=1
θ[xa − xa+1]
S∏
a=1
θ
[
xa − 1
a
a∑
m=1
xm +
1
a
√
α
c
]
(56)
One confirms easily that these expressions obey
∑S
k=1 φk = 1, as they should. Our
formulae (55,56) can be simplified, if needed, by generating and exploiting permutation-
invariant terms. For instance, φ1 and φ2 can be rewritten as
φ1 = S!
∫
Dx θ[x1 − x2 −
√
α
c
]
S∏
m=3
θ[xm−1 − xm]
= S!
∫
Dx θ[x1 −
√
α
c
−max
a≥2
xa]
S∏
m=3
θ[xm−1 − xm]
=
S!
(S − 1)!
∫
Dx θ[x1 −
√
α
c
−max
a≥2
xa]
= S
∫
Dx
{
1
2
+
1
2
erf
( x√
2
−
√
α
2c
)}S−1
(57)
φ2 = S!
∫
Dx θ[x2− x1+
√
α
c
]θ[x1+ x2− 2x3−
√
α
c
]
S∏
m=2
θ[xm−1− xm]
= S!
∫
Dx θ[x1− x2]θ[x2− x1+
√
α
c
]θ[x2−max
a>2
xa]
× θ[x1+ x2− 2max
a>2
xa−
√
α
c
]
S∏
m=4
θ[xm−1− xm
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=
S!
(S − 2)!
∫
Dx θ[x1− x2]θ[x2− x1+
√
α
c
]θ[x2−max
a>2
xa]
× θ[x1+ x2− 2max
a>2
xa−
√
α
c
]
= S(S−1)
∫
DxDy θ[
√
α
c
+ y − x]θ[x − y]
×
{∫
Dz θ[y − z]θ[x + y − 2z −
√
α
c
]
}S−2
= S(S−1)
∫
Dx
∫ √α/c
0
du√
2π
e−
1
2
(x−u)2
{
1
2
+
1
2
erf
(2x−u
2
√
2
−1
2
√
α
2c
)}S−2
(58)
We can now also calculate the disorder-averaged strategy frequency distribution
̺(f) = limN→∞N−1
∑
i 〈δ[f − fai]〉, which gives the fraction of agents in the stationary
state that use strategy a with frequency f . The problem is strategy permutation
invariant, so ̺(f) cannot depend on a. We may therefore write it in the permutation-
invariant form ̺(f) = limN→∞(SN)−1
∑
ia 〈δ[f − fai]〉, and calculate it by applying our
formula (52) to the function Φ({xa, fa(x|ℓ)}) = S−1∑Sa=1 δ[f − fa(x|ℓ)]. This gives,
upon using our above formulae for the φℓ:
̺(f) = (S−1)!
S∑
ℓ=1
S∑
b=1
∫
Dx δ[f − fb(x|ℓ)]
S−1∏
a=1
θ[xa − xa+1]
×∏
a<ℓ
θ
[
xa+1 − 1
a
a∑
m=1
xm +
1
a
√
α
c
]
×
{
δℓS + (1− δℓS) θ
[1
ℓ
ℓ∑
m=1
xm− 1
ℓ
√
α
c
− xℓ+1
]}
= δ(f)
S−1∑
ℓ=1
(1− ℓ
S
)φℓ + δ(f − 1) 1
S
φ1
+ (S−1)!
S∑
ℓ=2
ℓ∑
b=1
∫
Dx δ
[
f−1
ℓ
−
√
c
α
(
xb−1
ℓ
ℓ∑
m=1
xm
)]
×
S−1∏
a=1
θ[xa − xa+1]
ℓ−1∏
a=1
θ
[
xa+1 − 1
a
a∑
m=1
xm +
1
a
√
α
c
]
×
{
δℓS + (1− δℓS) θ
[1
ℓ
ℓ∑
m=1
xm− 1
ℓ
√
α
c
− xℓ+1
]}
(59)
One can recover the full generating functional theory of the S = 2 batch MG as in e.g.
[10, 11] from the above more general equations, as a test (taking into account carefully
the different definitions of correlation and response functions that were made in earlier
studies). We will not give details of this in principle straightforward exercise here.
Finally, in the limit α → ∞ our theory predicts that the MG will behave for any
S as if the agents were to select strategies completely randomly, as one expects. Here,
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upon using S!
∑S
a=1
∫
Dx
∏S−1
a=1 θ[xa−xa+1] = 1 one finds that our equations simplify to
lim
α→∞ c = S
−1 lim
α→∞χ = 0 (60)
lim
α→∞φℓ = δℓS limα→∞ ̺(f) = δ
(
f − 1
S
)
(61)
8. Application to MGs with S = 3
The case S = 3 is the simplest situation where all the complexities of having more than
two strategies per agent can be studied, so we will deal with this in detail. Here, with
persistence, one can do most of the nested integrations in (53,54,55,56,59) analytically.
We give some of the basic identities that this involves in Appendix C. The result is
most easily expressed in parametric form in terms of the auxiliary variable u =
√
α/c.
The fundamental order parameter equation (53) for the persistent correlations c then
becomes
c = 1 + (1− 3c
α
)I(u)− 1
4
erf(
u
2
)
[
3 + erf(
u
2
√
3
)
]
+
3
2u2
[
erf(
u
2
)− u√
π
e−
1
2
u2
]
+
3
2u2
erf(
u
2
)
[
erf(
u
2
√
3
)− u√
3π
e−
1
12
u2
]
+
3
2u
√
π
erf(
u
2
√
3
)e−
1
4
u2 (62)
with I(u) = 2
∫ u/√2
0 Dx erf(x/
√
6) (this latter integral we could unfortunately not do
analytically, except for the limit I(∞) = 1/3). Solving equation (62) for c gives c as
a function of α; the result is shown and tested against simulation data in figure 9 (left
panel). Similarly, equation (54) for the susceptibility χ takes the explicit form
η˜χ
1 + η˜χ
=
3
2α
{
erf(
u
2
)
[
1 + erf(
u
2
√
3
)
]
− 2I(u)
}
(63)
It follows that the χ = ∞ phase transition occurs at a value αc that must be solved
(numerically) from the following two coupled equations
α =
3
2
{
erf(
u
2
)
[
1 + erf(
u
2
√
3
)
]
− 2I(u)
}
(64)
α
u2
= 1 + (1− 3c
α
)I(u)− 1
4
erf(
u
2
)
[
3+erf(
u
2
√
3
)
]
+
3
2u2
[
erf(
u
2
)− u√
π
e−
1
2
u2
]
+
3
2u2
erf(
u
2
)
[
erf(
u
2
√
3
)− u√
3π
e−
1
12
u2
]
+
3
2u
√
π
erf(
u
2
√
3
)e−
1
4
u2 (65)
Upon solving these equations one finds that αc ≈ 0.824. After doing the integrals in our
expressions (55,56) for the fractions φℓ of agents that play ℓ of their three strategies one
obtains the following explicit formulae (expressed once more in terms of u =
√
α/c, i.e. in
terms of the solution of our previous equation for c), which indeed obey φ1+φ2+φ3 = 1:
φ1 = 1− 3
2
erf(
u
2
) +
3
2
I(u) (66)
φ2 =
3
2
erf(
u
2
)
[
1− erf( u
2
√
3
)
]
(67)
φ3 =
3
2
erf(
u
2
) erf(
u
2
√
3
)− 3
2
I(u) (68)
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Figure 9. Left: the predicted persistent correlations c = limτ→∞ C(τ) (solid curve)
for S = 3, as a function of α = p/N , calculated for ergodic stationary states. It is shown
together with corresponding data measured in numerical simulations of MGs without
decision noise, for both biased initial conditions (random initial strategy valuations
drawn from [−10, 10], •) and for unbiased initial conditions (random initial strategy
valuations drawn from [−10−4, 10−4], ◦). Simulation system size: N = 4097. Dashed:
the phase transition point αc(3) ≈ 0.824. Right: the fractions φℓ of agents that play
precisely ℓ ∈ {1, 2, 3} of their S = 3 strategies, as a function of α = p/N , calculated
for ergodic stationary states. Note that φ1 + φ2 + φ3 = 1.
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Figure 10. The fractions φℓ for S = 3 are shown together with corresponding
data measured in numerical simulations of MGs without decision noise, for both
biased initial conditions (random initial strategy valuations drawn from [−10, 10], •)
and for unbiased initial conditions (random initial strategy valuations drawn from
[−10−4, 10−4], ◦). Simulation system size: N = 4097. Dashed: the phase transition
point αc(3) ≈ 0.824.
These three expressions are shown as functions of α in figure 9, and tested against
numerical simulations in figure 10. For large α the agents tend to use all three strategies,
upon reducing α one finds increasing numbers switching to the use of only one or only
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two of their strategies. Again, as in the previous figures involving c, we observe a perfect
agreement between theory and simulations in the regime where our theory applies, i.e.
for α > αc. Furthermore, the value found for αc is consistent with the simulation data
in that non-ergodicity (a dependence on initial conditions, i.e. on whether one chooses
biased or unbiased strategy valuations at time zero) is indeed seen to set in at the
predicted point.
Finally, perhaps the most sensitive test of our S = 3 theory is to work out and
validate our formula (59) for the strategy frequency distribution. Upon doing the
relevant integrals we find confirmed that ̺(f) = 0 for f /∈ [0, 1] (as it should), whereas
for f ∈ [0, 1] we arrive at
̺(f) =
u√
π
e−u
2(f− 1
2
)2
[
1− erf( u
2
√
3
)
]
+
u
√
3
2
√
π
e−
3
4
u2(f− 1
3
)2erf(
u
2
(1− f))
+ δ(f)(
2
3
φ1 +
1
3
φ2) + δ(f − 1)1
3
φ1 (69)
One can understand this formula qualitatively. A strategy a is not played at all
when either ℓ = 1 and it is among the two non-selected strategies (this happens with
probability 2
3
φ1), or when ℓ = 2 and it is the one non-selected strategy (this happens
with probability 1
3
φ2). A strategy a is played permanently if ℓ = 1 and it is the selected
one (this happens with probability 1
3
φ1). Hence the second line of (69). The first line
of (69) reflects a being played now and then (among other strategies), with non-trivial
frequencies; here one observes the expected local maxima at f = 1
2
(corresponding to the
‘average’ behaviour for ℓ = 2) and at f = 1
3
(corresponding to the ‘average’ behaviour
for ℓ = 3). Also the prediction (69) agrees perfectly with numerical simulations, as
shown in figure 11, in the regime α > αc for which is is supposed to be correct.
In summary, we may conclude that for S = 3 all our theoretical predictions
regarding stationary state order parameters, the location of the phase transition, and
even quantities such as the strategy frequency distribution, make physical sense and
find perfect confirmation in numerical simulations.
9. Application to MGs with S = 4, 5
We now turn to S > 3. Although it is in principle still possible to proceed with the
various integrals in (53,54,55,56,59) analytically, for S > 3 this would become a very
tedious and time-consuming exercise. We have here resorted to numerical evaluation;
one does not expect qualitatively different physics to emerge compared to S = 3, and
life is short. For reasons of brevity we have also restricted ourselves to the validation of
the static observables c and φℓ only. It should be mentioned that upon increasing the
value of S, the accurate numerical evaluation (based on the Gauss-Legendre method) of
the various nested integrals in our theoretical expressions becomes nontrivial in terms of
CPU quite quickly; especially for small values of α. Finding the expressions for αc(S) as
presented in section 7 for S > 3 already involved a careful assessment of the scaling of
these values with the parameters that control the numerical integration accuracy. One
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Figure 11. Examples of the predicted strategy frequency distribution ̺(f) (thick
curves), for S = 3 and different values of α = p/N , as calculated for ergodic stationary
states. They are shown together with strategy frequency data measured in numerical
simulations of MGs without decision noise (shown as histograms, averaged over three
samples), for both biased initial conditions (random initial strategy valuations drawn
from [−10, 10], left graphs) and for unbiased initial conditions (random initial strategy
valuations drawn from [−10−4, 10−4], right graphs). Simulation system size: N = 4097.
Note that αc(3) ≈ 0.824, so the top two graphs refer to the nonergodic regime, where
the present theory is not supposed to apply.
also finds that for increasing values of S the finite size effects in the non-ergodic regime
α < αc(S) become more prominent.
For S = 4 the results of evaluating numerically the theoretical predictions
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Figure 12. Left: the predicted persistent correlations c = limτ→∞C(τ) (solid curve)
for S = 4, as a function of α = p/N , calculated for ergodic stationary states. It is shown
together with corresponding data measured in numerical simulations of MGs without
decision noise, for both biased initial conditions (random initial strategy valuations
drawn from [−10, 10], •) and for unbiased initial conditions (random initial strategy
valuations drawn from [−10−4, 10−4], ◦). Simulation system size: N = 4097. Dashed:
the phase transition point αc(4) ≈ 1.324. Right: the fractions φℓ of agents that play
precisely ℓ ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} of their S = 4 strategies, as a function of α = p/N , calculated
for ergodic stationary states. Note that φ1 + φ2 + φ3 + φ4 = 1.
(53,54,55,56) are shown and tested against simulation data (obtained for MGs without
decision noise) in figures 12 and 13. For S = 5 they are shown and tested in figures
14 and 15. It is very satisfactory that once more we observe for S ∈ {4, 5} in all cases
an excellent agreement between theory and simulation data, both with regards to the
observables measured (viz. c and the fractions φℓ), and in terms of the locations of the
transition points αc(4) and αc(5).
10. Stationary state fluctuations: volatility and predictability
Once the static order parameters c and χ are known, our formulae (25) for the volatility
σ and the predictability measure H can be reduced to
σ2 = η˜−2
∑
tt′≥0
R(t)C(t− t′)R(t′) H = c
(1 + η˜χ)2
(70)
As for S = 2,H can always be expressed fully in terms of persistent order parameters and
vanishes at the phase transition point. The result is shown in figure 16 for S ∈ {3, 4, 5}.
If in the volatility formula we separate the correlation function into a static and a
non-persistent part, C(t) = c+ C˜(t) with limt→±∞ C˜(t) = 0, we obtain
σ2 =
c
(1 + η˜χ)2
+
∑
tt′≥0
(1I + η˜G)−1(t)C˜(t− t′)(1I + η˜G)−1(t′)
=
c
(1 + η˜χ)2
+ (1− c)∑
t
[(1I + η˜G)−1(t)]2
Batch minority games with arbitrary strategy numbers 25
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
0.1 1.0
φ1
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
0.1 1.0
φ2
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
0.1 1.0
α
φ3
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
0.1 1.0
α
φ4
Figure 13. The fractions φℓ for S = 4 are shown together with corresponding
data measured in numerical simulations of MGs without decision noise, for both
biased initial conditions (random initial strategy valuations drawn from [−10, 10], •)
and for unbiased initial conditions (random initial strategy valuations drawn from
[−10−4, 10−4], ◦). Simulation system size: N = 4097. Dashed: the phase transition
point αc(4) ≈ 1.324.
+
∑
t6=t′
(1I + η˜G)−1(t)C˜(t− t′)(1I + η˜G)−1(t′) (71)
Expression (71) is still exact. The first term is recognized to be H . The other terms
contain the short-time fluctuations, involving non-persistent dynamic order parameters.
If one seeks a formula for σ in terms static order parameters only, one must pay the price
of approximation. To do this we generalize the two procedures described for the S = 2
batch MG in e.g. [10, 11] and [4]. Both rely on the ansatz, motivated by observations
in simulations, that the response function decays to zero very slowly, subject to the
constraint
∑
tG(t) = χ. Upon putting e.g. G(t > 0) = χ(e
z − 1)e−zt with z → 0 one
finds for such kernels that limz→0
∑
t[(1I + η˜G)(t)]
2 = 0. Consequently we may write
σ2 ≈ c
(1 + η˜χ)2
+
∑
t6=t′
(1I + η˜G)−1(t)C˜(t− t′)(1I + η˜G)−1(t′) (72)
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Figure 14. Left: the predicted persistent correlations c = limτ→∞C(τ) (solid curve)
for S = 5, as a function of α = p/N , calculated for ergodic stationary states. It is shown
together with corresponding data measured in numerical simulations of MGs without
decision noise, for both biased initial conditions (random initial strategy valuations
drawn from [−10, 10], •) and for unbiased initial conditions (random initial strategy
valuations drawn from [−10−4, 10−4], ◦). Simulation system size: N = 4097. Dashed:
the phase transition point αc(5) ≈ 1.822. Right: the fractions φℓ of agents that play
precisely ℓ ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} of their S = 5 strategies, as a function of α = p/N , calculated
for ergodic stationary states.
The most brutal approximation of C˜ is to assume the correlations to decay to zero very
fast, and simply put C˜(t)→ C˜(0)δt0 = (1− c)δtt′ . This leads to the formula
σ2A =
c
(1 + η˜χ)2
+ 1− c (73)
Alternatively, we may write the average in the definition (21) of the correlation function
as a sum of contributions representing the possible sizes ℓ of the set of active strategies:
C(t− t′) = δtt′ + (1− δtt′)
S∑
ℓ=1
φℓ
∑
a
〈δa,m(v(t),z(t)δa,m(v(t′),z(t′)〉ℓ active (74)
This is still exact, but now we approximate for t 6= t′∑
a
〈δa,m(v(t),z(t)δa,m(v(t′),z(t′)〉ℓ active ≈
∑
a
〈δa,m(v(t),z(t)〉ℓ active〈δa,m(v(t′),z(t′)〉ℓ active
≈ ℓ−1
This gives C˜(t− t′) ≈ δtt′ − c+ (1− δtt′)∑Sℓ=1 φℓ/ℓ and hence the approximation
σ2B =
∑S
ℓ=1 φℓ/ℓ
(1 + η˜χ)2
+ 1−
S∑
ℓ=1
φℓ/ℓ (75)
Formula (73) is identical to what was already proposed for S = 2 in [6]; formula (75)
generalizes to arbitary values of S the S = 2 volatility approximation first published
in [10, 11]. Our two approximation formulae have more or less opposite deficits, since
(73) fails to incorporate any transient contributions to the correlations (here C˜(t) = 0
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Figure 15. The fractions φℓ for S = 5 are shown together with corresponding
data measured in numerical simulations of MGs without decision noise, for both
biased initial conditions (random initial strategy valuations drawn from [−10, 10], •)
and for unbiased initial conditions (random initial strategy valuations drawn from
[−10−4, 10−4], ◦). Simulation system size: N = 4097. Dashed: the phase transition
point αc(5) ≈ 1.822.
for t 6= 0), whereas (75) incorporates too many (here limt→∞ C˜(t) = ∑Sℓ=1 φℓ/ℓ− c 6= 0).
For batch MGs one finds that (75) is more accurate than (73), see e.g. figure 17.
11. Dynamics for very small and very large α
Solving our order parameters C and G from (21) for finite times is generally non-trivial
due to the non-Markovian nature of the effective process (19). Only for extreme values
of α, viz. for α → 0 and α → ∞, and for short times it can to some extent be done.
The causality constraint Gtt′ = 0 for t ≥ t′ allows us to calculate with little difficulty
the first few time steps and gain a better understanding of the nature of the dynamics,
especially with regard to the role of the initial conditions and the dependence on the
control parameter α. Causality implies that (Gn)tt′ = 0 for t − t′ < n, so that for
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Figure 16. The measureH = limN→∞ p
−1
∑
µ[limτ→∞ τ
−1
∑τ
t=1(Aµ(t)−〈A(t)〉)]2 of
the overall market bid predictability, for time-translation invariant states, as a function
of the control parameter α = p/N for S ∈ {3, 4, 5} (from top to bottom). Dashed: the
corresponding phase transition points αc(S).
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Figure 17. The two approximate volatility formulas σA and σB (lower and upper solid
curves, respectively) as functions of α = p/N , for S ∈ {3, 4, 5}, calculated in the ergodic
regime α > αc. They are shown together with volatility data measured in numerical
simulations of MGs without decision noise, for both biased initial conditions (random
initial strategy valuations drawn from [−10, 10], •) and for unbiased initial conditions
(random initial strategy valuations drawn from [−10−4, 10−4], ◦). Simulation system
size: N = 4097. Dashed: the corresponding phase transition points αc(S).
t ≥ t′ ≥ 0:
Rtt′ = η˜(1I + η˜G)
−1
tt′ = η˜
t−t′∑
n=0
(−η˜)n(Gn)tt′ (76)
Σtt′ = 〈ηa(t)ηb(t′)〉 = δab(RCR†)tt′
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=
δab
η˜2
t∑
s=0
t′∑
s′=0
t−s∑
n=0
t′−s′∑
n′=0
(−η˜)n+n′(Gn)ts(Gn′)t′s′Css′ (77)
For short times all these expressions reduce to simple finite sums; for instance:
R00 = R11 = η˜, Σ00 = η˜
2
R10 = −η˜2G10, Σ10 = η˜2(C10 −G10)
R21 = −η˜2G21, Σ11 = η˜2 − 2η˜3G10C10 + η˜4(G10)2
R20 = η˜
3G21G10 − η˜2G20
One can now in the familiar manner solve the effective single agent agent process for the
first few time steps. The resulting expressions would be fully exact (for any α, including
those in the nonergodic regime α < αc(S)), but increasingly involved.
For very large and very small α matters become relatively simple, but the result is
still quite informative. We will discuss only the deterministic case; adding decision noise
will only introduce transparent stochastic variations of the behaviour described below.
For large α and finite times the single agent process tells us that G = O(1/η˜√α), that
the effective Gaussian noise scales as ηa(t) = O(1), and that
t = 0 : va(1) = −αδa,argmaxb[vb(0)] +O(
√
α) (78)
t > 0 : va(t+ 1) = va(t)− αδa,argmaxb[vb(t)] +O(
√
α) (79)
Let us assume that va(0) = O(α0) for all α, and exclude the pathological case where
two or more initial valuations are identical. According to (78), the strategy with the
largest initial valuation is selected at time t = 1, but will then move to the back of the
list of ordered valuations. At the next step the second largest is selected, and then,
following (79), also moved to the back of the ordered list, etc. The net result is that
all valuations va(t) will become increasingly negative (proportional to α), growing on
average linearly with time, and that the effective agent will continually alternate his S
strategies in a fixed order, being the order in which the valuations are ranked initially.
If, for example, v1(0) > v2(0) > . . . > vS(0), then argmaxb[vb(t)] = t+1 mod S, and for
t > 0 the effective agent equation gives
va(t) = − α
t−1∑
t′=0
δa,t′+1 mod S +O(t
√
α)
= − α int
[S + t + 1− a
S
]
+O(t√α) (80)
where int[z] denotes the largest integer m such that z ≥ m. This is the generalization
to S > 2 of the period-2 oscillations known to occur in MGs with S = 2. For arbitrary
valuation initializations v(0) = v0 the above solution generalizes to
va(t) = − α int
[S + t + 1− π
v0(a)
S
]
+O(t√α) (81)
with π
v
denoting that permutation of {1, . . . , S} for which vπ(1) > vπ(2) > . . . > vπ(S). If
v0 is drawn randomly from some finite-width distribution, corresponding to the situation
where the agents in the original N -agent system are initialized non-identically, all agents
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would still continually alternate their strategies in a fixed order, but the orders would
now generally be different for different agents. The dynamic order parameters would in
either case be Ctt′ = δt,t′mod S +O(α−1/2) and Gtt′ = O(α−1/2).
Let us finally turn to small α. Here the effective process (19) describes only small
valuation changes at each time step, and one consequently finds that Ctt′ = 1+O(
√
α)
and Gtt′ = O(
√
α). The effective Gaussian noise in (19) is static in leading order in α,
〈ηa(t)ηb(t′)〉 = η˜2δab + O(
√
α), and in the absence of perturbation fields equation (19)
gives simply
va(t) = va(0) + tη˜
√
αza +O(α) (82)
where the za are independent frozen random Gaussian variables, with zero average and
unit variance. The systems remains static for a period of order t ∼ ∆/η˜√α, where
∆ indicates the magnitude of the initial valuation differences. A full analysis of the
solution of our effective agent equations following this transient stage is in the small α
regime a highly nontrivial exercise, which (to our knowledge) even for S = 2 has not
yet been carried out, and would merit a full and extensive study in itself.
12. Discussion
In this paper we have shown how the generating functional analysis theory of minority
games, developed in full initially only for S = 2, can be generalized to MGs with
arbitrary values of S. The key obstacle in this generalization turned out not to be
the derivation of closed equations for dynamic order parameters (via a generalized
effective single agent process) but rather the solution of these equations in time-
translation invariant stationary states. In previous studies closure of persistent order
parameter equations could not yet be achieved analytically, and equations had to be
closed artificially with the help of simulation data [6, 8]. At a technical level the basic
problem was the calculation of the strategy selection frequencies of the effective agent.
This problem has now been solved, resulting in exact and explicit closed equations for
persistent order parameters and for phase transition points, for any value of S.
In our applications of the resulting theory we have mainly concentrated on the
simplest nontrivial case S = 3, complemented by further applications to S = 4
and S = 5. In all cases, the predictions of our theory in time translation invariant
stationary states without anomalous response were shown to agree perfectly with
numerical simulation data, including sensitive measures such as the strategy frequency
distribution. We have not been able to solve our order parameter equations in all
possible situations, however, those regimes where we could not proceed to full solution
(e.g. calculating stationary states in the regime α < αc(S), and non-persistent order
parameters at arbitrary times) are the same as those which also for the simpler case
S = 2 have so far resisted the efforts of statistical mechanicists. Put differently, our
objective and contribution here has been to raise the solvability of MGs with arbitrary
values of S to the same level as that of MGs with S = 2.
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It will clear that several further applications, developments and generalizations
of the theory could now be taken up. One could for instance explore in more detail
the effects of decision noise on MGs with S > 2, for which we have generated the
required mathematical tools but for which we have not worked out the full consequences
(such as the often counter-intuitive impact on the volatility, or the phase diagrams for
multiplicative noise in the (α, T ) plane). Alternatively, one could develop an S > 2
generating functional analysis for the so-called fake history on-line MGs [13], where
valuation updates are made after each randomly drawn sample of the global information.
Probably the most interesting and nontrivial next step, however, would be to investigate
the structure and the stationary state solutions of an S > 2 theory for MGs where the
global information is no longer drawn randomly but represents the actual global history
of the market, by generalization of [14].
Note
While finishing this paper we were made aware of another study in progress, aiming
also to solve the strategy frequency problem for minority games with more than two
strategies per agent, but in the context of multi-asset MGs [15], and using a somewhat
different approach (which one must ultimately expect to be mathematically equivalent).
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Appendix A. Derivation of effective single agent equation
Extremization of the exponent Ψ+Φ+Ω, as defined by (16,17,18), with respect to the
dynamic order parameters {C, Cˆ,K, Kˆ, L, Lˆ} gives the following saddle-point equations:
Ctt′ =
∑
a
〈δa,m(v(t),z(t))δa,m(v(t′),z(t′))〉⋆ (A.1)
Ktt′ =
∑
a
〈δa,m(v(t),z(t)) vˆa(t′)〉⋆ (A.2)
Ltt′ =
∑
a
〈vˆa(t)vˆa(t′)〉⋆ (A.3)
Cˆtt′ = i
∂Φ
∂Ctt′
Kˆtt′ = i
∂Φ
∂Ktt′
Lˆtt′ = i
∂Φ
∂Ltt′
(A.4)
with the abbreviation 〈f(v, v̂, z)〉⋆ = limN→∞N−1∑i〈f(v, v̂, z)〉i, where
〈f(v, v̂, z)〉i =
∫ [∏
at
dva(t)dvˆa(t)
2π
]
〈f(v, v̂, z)Fi(v, v̂, z)〉z∫ [∏
at
dva(t)dvˆa(t)
2π
]
〈Fi(v, v̂, z)〉z
(A.5)
Fi(v, v̂, z) = P0(v(0)) e
i
∑
at
vˆa(t)[va(t+1)−va(t)−θia(t)]+i
∑
at
ψia(t)δa,m(v(t),z(t)) (A.6)
× e−i
∑
att′[Cˆtt′δa,m(v(t),z(t))δa,m(v(t′),z(t′))+Lˆtt′ vˆa(t)vˆa(t
′)+Kˆtt′δa,m(v(t),z(t))vˆa(t
′)]
Via (9,10) and the identity Z[0] = 1 one confirms as usual, for the physical saddle-point,
that the Ctt′ are indeed the correlations in (9), that Ltt′ = 0, and that Ktt′ = iGtt′ .
Putting ψ → 0 (they are no longer needed) and choosing θia = θa (site-independent
perturbations) eliminates the dependence of (A.6) on i: Fi(v, v̂, z) = F (v, v̂, z). Next,
to evaluate equations (A.4) we need to work out the function Φ (17) for small {Ltt′}.
Upon eliminating K via K = iG, and with the short-hands 1I for the identity matrix
and (A†)tt′ = At′t, we find
Φ = α log
∫ [∏
t
dxtdxˆt
2π
eixtxˆt
]
e−
1
2
∑
tt′
xtCtt′xt′+iη˜
∑
tt′
xtGtt′ xˆt′
×
[
1− 1
2
η˜2
∑
tt′
xˆtLtt′ xˆt′ +O(L2)
]
= − 1
2
α log det
[
(1I + η˜G†)(1I + η˜G)
]
− 1
2
αη˜2
∑
tt′
Ltt′
[
(1I + η˜G)−1C(1I + η˜G†)−1
]
tt′
+O(L2) (A.7)
For L = 0 the three saddle-point equations (A.4) now become
Cˆtt′ = 0 Kˆtt′ = −αη˜(1 + η˜G†)−1tt′ (A.8)
Lˆtt′ = − 1
2
iαη˜2
[
(1I + η˜G)−1C(1I + η˜G†)−1
]
tt′
(A.9)
Upon inserting these expressions into (A.6), and using causality (viz. Gtt′ = 0 for
t ≤ t′) one can now prove that the denominator of (A.5) equals one. This, in turn,
implies that 〈g(v, z)vˆa(t)〉⋆ = i∂〈g(v, z)〉⋆/∂θa. We are then in a position to integrate
out all occurrences of the conjugate integration variables {vˆa}, and end up with the
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remaining saddle-point equations
Ctt′ =
∑
a
〈δa,m(v(t),z(t))δa,m(v(t′),z(t′))〉⋆ (A.10)
Gtt′ =
∑
a
∂
∂θa(t′)
〈δa,m(v(t),z(t))〉⋆ (A.11)
where
〈f(v, z)〉⋆ =
∫ [∏
at
dva(t)
]
〈f(v, z)F (v, z)〉
z
(A.12)
F (v, z) = P (v(0))
∫ [∏
at
dvˆa(t)
2π
] ∫ [∏
at
dηa(t)
]
×∏
at
δ
[
ηa(t)− 1√
α
(
va(t+1)−va(t)−θa(t)+αη˜
∑
t′
(1I+η˜G)−1tt′ δa,m(v(t′),z(t′))
)]
× ei
√
α
∑
at
vˆa(t)ηa(t)− 12αη˜2
∑
a
∑
tt′
vˆa(t)[(1I+η˜G)−1C(1I+η˜G†)−1]tt′ vˆa(t
′)
= P (v(0))
∫ [∏
at
dηa(t)√
2π
]∏
a
e
− 1
2
η˜−2
∑
tt′
ηa(t)[(1I+η˜G†)C−1(1I+η˜G)]tt′ηa(t
′)
det−
1
2 [(1I+ η˜G†)C−1(1I+ η˜G)]

×∏
at
[
va(t+1)−va(t)−θa(t)+αη˜
∑
t′
(1I+η˜G)−1tt′ δa,m(v(t′),z(t′))
]
(A.13)
We recognize the above measure to represent the statistics of an effective single agent
process, with dynamics defined as
va(t+ 1) = va(t) + θa(t)− αη˜
∑
t′
Rtt′δa,m(v(t′),z(t′)) +
√
α ηa(t) (A.14)
Here Rtt′ = η˜(1I + η˜G)
−1
tt′ , and ηa(t) is a Gaussian noise characterized by the moments
〈ηa(t)〉 = 0 and 〈ηa(t)ηb(t′)〉 = δab(RCR†)tt′ .
Appendix B. The volatility matrix
Here we outline briefly how the generating functional (22) for overall bid fluctuations
can be calculated via simple modifications of the generating functional Z[ψ] defined in
(8). Comparison with (8) shows that in the latter we should replace
ei
∑
iat
ψia(t)δa,m(vi(t),zi(t)) → ei
∑
µat
φµ(t)N−1/2
∑
i
Riaµ δa,m(vi(t),zi(t))
This is found to imply making the replacement xµt → xµt +Φµ(t) in the disorder average,
and ultimately has an effect only on the exponent Φ of the saddle-point problem (leaving
Ψ and Ω unaffected). The latter will now become
Φ =
1
N
∑
µ
log
∫ [∏
t
dxtdxˆt
2π
eixtxˆt
] [
1− 1
2
η˜2
∑
tt′
xˆtLtt′ xˆt′ +O(L2)
]
× e− 12
∑
tt′
(xt+φµ(t))Ctt′ (xt′+φµ(t
′))+iη˜
∑
tt′
(xt+φµ(t))Gtt′ xˆt′
= − 1
2
α log det
[
(1I + η˜G†)(1I + η˜G)
]
+
1
N
∑
µ
log
[
1−1
2
∑
tt′
(
Ltt′+
φµ(t)φµ(t
′)
η˜2
)
(RCR†)tt′+O(L2, φ4)
]
(B.1)
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We can now calculate from Z[φ] the quantities of interest. Upon emphasizing the
dependence of (B.1) on the fields φ, and using the normalization Z[0] = 1, we obtain:
lim
N→∞
〈Aµ(t)〉 = − i lim
N→∞
lim
φ→0
∂Z[φ]
∂φµ(t)
= − i lim
N→∞
lim
φ→0
∂
∂φµ(t)
eN [Φ(φ)−Φ(0)]|saddle
= − i lim
φ→0
∂
∂φµ(t)
∏
λ
[
1−1
2
∑
ss′
φλ(s)
(RCR†)ss′
η˜2
φλ(s
′)+ . . .
]
= 0 (B.2)
lim
N→∞
〈Aµ(t)Aν(t′)〉 = − lim
N→∞
lim
φ→0
∂2Z[φ]
∂φµ(t)∂φν(t′)
= − lim
N→∞
lim
φ→0
∂2
∂φµ(t)∂φν(t′)
eN [Φ(φ)−Φ(0)]|saddle
= − lim
φ→0
∂2
∂φµ(t)φν(t′)
∏
λ
[
1−1
2
∑
ss′
φλ(s)
(RCR†)ss′
η˜2
φλ(s
′)+ . . .
]
= η˜−2δµν(RCR
†)tt′ (B.3)
Appendix C. Integration identities
Here we simply list (without proof) some of the basic identities that one uses in doing
the various integrals in the S = 3 theory analytically, for the benefit of the reader:∫ u
0
Dx x2 =
1
2
erf(
u√
2
)− u√
2π
e−
1
2
u2 (C.1)∫
Dx erf(A+Bx) = erf
( A√
1 + 2B2
)
(C.2)∫
Dx x erf(A +Bx) =
2B√
π(1+2B2)
e−A
2/(1+2B2) (C.3)
∫
Dx erf2(Bx) =
4
π
arctan
(√
1 + 4B2
)
− 1 (C.4)∫
Dx erf2(A+Bx) =
4
π
arctan
(√
1 + 4B2
)
− 1
+
4√
π
∫ A/√1+2B2
0
dx e−x
2
erf
( x√
1 + 4B2
)
(C.5)
Appendix D. The strategy frequency problem for multiplicative noise
Here we discuss briefly the solution of the strategy frequency problem for multiplicative
decision noise: m(v, z) = r argmaxa[va] + (1 − r)b, with random r ∈ {0, 1} and
b ∈ {1, . . . , S}. The deterministic case corresponds to P (r) = δr,1. Again we define
v⋆(x) = maxb vb(x) and the set Λ(x) via (31). Upon abbreviating λ =
∑
r P (r)r ∈ [0, 1],
the solution now proceeds as follows
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• Since va(s,x) = s[va(x) + εa(s,x)] with lims→∞ εa(s,x) = 0 we may write the
second equation in (28) as
fa(x) = lim
s→∞
{
λ δa,argmaxb[vb(x)+εb(s,x)] + (1− λ)S−1
}
=
1− λ
S
+ λ lim
s→∞
∏
b6=a
〈
θ
[
va(x)− vb(x) + εa(s,x)− εb(s,x)
]
This second term can be nonzero only for a ∈ Λ(x). Hence, once we know Λ(x)
and v⋆(x) the problem is solved:
a /∈ Λ(x) : fa(x) = (1−λ)/S, va(x) = αχR(xa
√
c
α
−1−λ
S
) (D.1)
a ∈ Λ(x) : fa(x) = xa
√
c
α
− v
⋆(x)
αχ
R
, va(x) = v
⋆(x) (D.2)
• The value v⋆(x) is again calculated from ∑a fa(x) = 1, but now also strategies
a 6∈ Λ(x) are involved. We abbreviate |Λ(x)|−1∑b∈Λ(x) Ub = 〈U〉Λ(x), and sum over
the indices in both (D.1) and (D.2) to get
v⋆(x) = χ
R
√
αc
∑
a∈Λ(x)
〈x〉Λ(x) − αχR
( λ
|Λ(x)| +
1−λ
S
)
(D.3)
equations (D.1,D.2) thus become
a /∈Λ(x) : fa(x) = (1−λ)/S, va(x) = αχR(xa
√
c
α
−1−λ
S
) (D.4)
a∈Λ(x) : fa(x) = λ|Λ(x)| +
1−λ
S
+
√
c
α
(
xa− 〈x〉Λ(x)
)
, va(x) = v
⋆(x)(D.5)
• What remains is to determine the set Λ(x). The definition (31) of Λ(x) demands
that va(x) < v
⋆(x) for all a 6∈ Λ(x), i.e.
a 6∈ Λ(x) : xa < 〈x〉Λ(x) −
√
α
c
λ
|Λ(x)| (D.6)
Demanding that expression (D.5) obeys fa(x) ∈ [0, 1] gives, similarly
a ∈ Λ(x) : xa ≥ 〈x〉Λ(x) −
√
α
c
( λ
|Λ(x)| +
1−λ
S
)
(D.7)
xa ≤ 〈x〉Λ(x) −
√
α
c
( λ
|Λ(x)| +
1−λ
S
)
+
√
α
c
(D.8)
So Λ(x) again contains the indices of the ℓ largest components of the x, where
ℓ = |Λ(x)|. For each x we define the permutation π
x
: {1, . . . , S} → {1, . . . , S} for
which these components will be ordered according to xπ(1) > xπ(2) > . . . > xπ(S), so
that our three inequalities can be written as
xπ(ℓ) ≥ 1
ℓ−1
ℓ−1∑
m=1
xπ(m) − 1
ℓ−1
√
α
c
(
λ+ (1−λ) ℓ
S
)
if ℓ > 1 (D.9)
xπ(ℓ+1) <
1
ℓ
ℓ∑
m=1
xπ(m) − 1
ℓ
√
α
c
λ if ℓ < S (D.10)
xπ(1) ≤ 1
ℓ
ℓ∑
m=1
xπ(m) − 1
ℓ
√
α
c
(
λ+ (1−λ) ℓ
S
)
+
√
α
c
(D.11)
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Similar to the case of additive noise we conclude that ℓ is the smallest number in
{1, . . . , S} for which (D.10) holds (if any), whereas if (D.10) never holds then ℓ = S.
We thereby satisfy also (D.9) (compared to additive noise we here even satisfy a
stronger condition). The proof that also the third condition (D.11) will be satisfied
is virtually identical to that given for additive noise, so need not be repeated here.
Since (D.9) and (D.10) are no longer mutually exclusive for λ < 1, it is no longer
immediately obvious that the solution is unique, but this can probably be proven.
From this point onwards one can translate the solution found into expressions for
averages of observables. This will once more involve a sum over all possible permutations
(from which the component ordering permutation π
x
is selected via a product of step
functions) and further step functions to implement the inequalities on the components
of x relative to the average over the strategies in the set Λ(x) that define this active set.
